Na presente comunicação pretendemos refletir a produção de nossos objetos de pesquisa, tendo a Teoria da Ação Comunicativa como pano de fundo. Com base no desafio de desenvolvimento da autonomia e a construção socioindividual da liberdade - por si só um tema extenso e de complexidade, lançamos o debate acerca dos pressupostos habermasianos em áreas como formação de professores, universidade, avaliação e educação ambiental..

The ontology of artefacts in Byzantine philosophy is still a terra incognita. One way of mapping this unexplored territory is to delve into Michael of Ephesus’ commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Written around 1100, this commentary provides a detailed interpretation of the most important source for Aristotle’s ontological account of artefacts. By highlighting Michael’s main metaphysical tenets and his interpretation of key-passages of the Aristotelian work, this study aims to reconstruct Michael’s ontology of artefacts and present it as one instance, which (...) is perhaps exemplary, of the Byzantine ontology of artefacts. In particular, the study shows that this commentary holds a definite position on the nature of artefacts, according to which they are neither substances nor hylomorphic compounds. Indeed, artefacts lack a form altogether and their forms exist only in thought. As a result, Michael’s commentary provides an ontological interpretation of artefacts as accidental beings, i.e., as matter which acquires a mere property as opposed to a substantial form. While such an interpretation shows originality when compared to the Aristotelian text, it also indicates adherence to the reading established by Alexander of Aphrodisias, despite important departures concerning the status of natural forms. (shrink)

During the past decade ethical theory has been in a lively state of development, and three basic approaches to ethics - Kantian ethics, consequentialism, and virtue ethics - have assumed positions of particular prominence.

1. Stoicism in classical Latin literature -- 2. Stoicism in Christian Latin thought through the sixth century.

Na seção 1.4.1 Do ceticismo quanto à razão do Tratado da Natureza Humana, David Hume apresenta o argumento cético, conhecido pelos intérpretes como o “argumento da diminuição”, que pode ser divido em duas partes: 1) dado o caráter falível de nossas operações cognitivas, todo o “conhecimento degenera em probabilidade”; e 2) dada a incerteza e a dúvida que comumente acompanham os nossos raciocínios probabilísticos, todo raciocínio é, no fim das contas, reduzido a nada e, consequentemente, somos levados à “extinção total (...) da crença e da evidência”. Apontaremos, em primeiro lugar, que o argumento cético contra a razão baseia-se no argumento cartesiano do “deus enganador” e, em segundo, que Hume rejeita que podemos endossar seriamente a “extinção total da crença e da evidência”. O que nos leva a propor a seguinte questão: em que consiste, para Hume, o status dos argumentos céticos? Responder tal pergunta implica em esclarecer outros dois problemas, pois, se não podemos atingir o “ceticismo total”, podemos, então, confiar em nossa faculdade de raciocínio? Se sim, sob quais condições podemos? Vê-se, afinal, que a solução de Hume consiste claramente em conferir limites à nossa faculdade de raciocínio, a fim de evitar sua autodestruição. (shrink)

A despeito de ser bem menos conhecido atualmente, o problema do ceticismo quanto à razão foi um assunto bastante relevante entre os autores dos séculos XVII e XVIII, da mesma maneira que o ceticismo quanto ao mundo exterior. Nesse sentido, busco apresentar os impactos de Huet sobre a posição de Hume no que concerne ao ceticismo quanto à razão do Tratado da Natureza Humana, particularmente a partir da versão pirrônica elaborada por Huet do argumento cartesiano do “Deus enganador”. Assim, como (...) mostrarei neste trabalho, Hume está correto pelo menos ao associar o argumento cético quanto à razão ao ceticismo pirrônico. Palavras-chaves: Huet. Hume. Ceticismo. Pirronismo. Razão. (shrink)

The emphasis on duly in Kant's ethics is widely held to constitute a defect. Marcia W. Baron develops and assesses the criticism, which she sees as comprising two objections: that duty plays too large a role, leaving no room for the supererogatory, and that Kant places too much value on acting from duty. Clearly written and cogently argued, Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology takes on the most philosophically intriguing objections to Kant's ethics and subjects them to a rigorous yet sympathetic (...) assessment. (shrink)

...believe that his theory asks too much, demanding total devotion to morality and treating everything worth doing (and perhaps more) as a duty. But, despite their differences, the two sets of...

In Metaphysics Z 8 Aristotle offers an infinite regress argument to deny that forms come to be. Briefly put, the argument states that, if we assume that every time an x composed of matter (m1) and form (f1) comes to be, f1 also comes to be, then there would be infinitely many xs coming to be – for f1 would itself be a compound, if it comes to be, and the same reasoning would in turn apply to it. This argument (...) has great significance in the history of philosophy, for some later thinkers take Aristotle to allow or make room for the creation ex nihilo of forms. However, the only direct Greek engagement with this argument in its proper context is provided by Asclepius of Tralles’ commentary on Book Z. A close study of Asclepius’ interpretation shows that he endorsed the argument on the tacit condition that it refers to the forms αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά as different from both Platonic Ideas and enmattered forms. At the same time, however, its elaboration includes alongside forms αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά also eternal separate forms and generated forms. His reconstruction also displays a sophisticated toning-down of the potential disagreements between Plato and Aristotle on the conception of pre-existing form which is assumed in the argument. Asclepius’ interpretation offers yet further proof of the commentators’ camouflaged and stratified way of tackling philosophical issues of paramount importance. (shrink)

This paper discusses the metaphysical status of artefacts and their forms in the ancient commentators on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Specifically, it examines the Peripatetic tradition and Alexander of Aphrodisias to then turn to the commentaries of the late Neoplatonist Asclepius of Tralles, and the Byzantine commentator Michael of Ephesus. It argues that Alexander is the pioneer of the interpretation of artefactual forms as qualities and artefacts as accidental beings. The fortune of this solution goes through Asclepius and Michael to influence Thomas (...) Aquinas. (shrink)

When successful and ethical managers are alerted to possible organizational wrongdoing, they take corrective action before the problems become crises. However, recent research [e.g., Rynes et al. (2007, Academy of Management Journal50(5), 987–1008)] indicates that many organizations fail to implement evidence-based practices (i.e., practices that are consistent with research findings), in many aspects of human resource management. In this paper, we draw from years of research on whistle-blowing by social scientists and legal scholars and offer concrete suggestions to managers who (...) are interested in encouraging internal reporting of problems requiring attention, and to observers of questionable activity who are considering reporting it. We also identify ways that research suggests policy-makers can have a more positive influence. We hope that these suggestions will help foster evidence-based practice regarding whistle-blowing. (shrink)

The distinction between justifications and excuses is a familiar one to most of us who work either in moral philosophy or legal philosophy. But exactly how it should be understood is a matter of considerable disagreement. My aim in this paper is, first, to sort out the differences and try to figure out what underlying disagreements account for them. I give particular attention to the following question: Does a person who acts on a reasonable but mistaken belief have a justification, (...) or only an excuse? One disagreement I highlight concerns the extent to which justification is primarily about agents rather than about actions. Those who think, as I do, of “His action, X, was justified” as “He was justified in doing X” are far more likely to allow that justification requires reasonable belief and does not require truth, than are those who think of “His action, X, was justified” as “Although actions of this type usually are prohibited, X is in these circumstances in fact permissible.” In addition to sorting out the differences and tracing them to some underlying disagreements, I defend the reasonable belief view of justification against some objections, and argue that, whether or not we continue to use the term “justified” in a way that does not require truth, we need the concept. Contrary to the claims of some who reject the reasonable belief view of justification, justification thus understood does not reduce to excuse. (shrink)

RESUMO Neste artigo, argumento que o compromisso de Hume com objetos independentes da mente está baseado em dois tipos de realismo ou sistema de realidades: (a) um realismo ingênuo baseado em uma crença vulgar injustificada que identifica percepções e objetos, e (b) um realismo representacional ou sistema filosófico de dupla existência. Em primeiro lugar, enfatizo que a questão filosófica “Se existem ou não corpos” não pode ser considerada um caso completo de ceticismo não mitigado, porque Hume aceita um ceticismo mitigado (...) compatível com o realismo vulgar e representacional. Além disso, argumento que, enquanto a crença vulgar nos corpos está baseada em um assentimento injustificado, a teoria da dupla-existência está baseada tanto em um assentimento injustificado quanto em um assentimento racionalmente justificado (que corrige o primeiro). Considerando todos esses pontos, concluo que o ceticismo mitigado de Hume permite e exige uma crença ou suposição de existências contínuas e distintas, e que isso deve, na prática, assumir formas vulgares e filosóficas em diferentes momentos. (shrink)

Clarke A. Chambers interviews Marcia Eaton, professor in the Department of Philosophy.

Gideon Rosen (2014) has drawn our attention to cases of duress of a particularly interesting sort: the person's ‘mind is not flooded with pain or fear’, she knows exactly what she is doing, and she makes a clear-headed choice to act in, as Rosen says, ‘awful ways’. The explanation of why we excuse such actions cannot be that the action was not voluntary. In addition, although some duress cases could also be viewed as necessity cases and thus as justified, Rosen (...) wisely sets aside that complicating factor by zeroing in on those cases where the action clearly is not justified. So why do we excuse in these cases, where the action is not justified and the agent acted voluntarily?Rosen thinks the key lies in the ‘ill will’ condition, ‘the idea that an act is blameworthy only if it manifests insufficient concern or regard for those affected’. He says this is relatively uncontroversial; much of my paper is taken up with calling the ‘ill will’ condition into question. I also take issue with Rosen on just how justifications and excuses differ. I argue in favour of understanding justifications (in a context where we are asking how justifications and excuses differ) as not requiring truth, but only reasonable belief. (shrink)

The way metaphysicians conceive of inadvertently made objects has consequences for their understanding of the relation between intentions and kinds. Indeed, the very possibility of concrete material objects produced without human intention shakes the common identification of an object’s kind and the intentions of the maker. The disruptive potential of inadvertently made objects also affects historians of philosophy, who have often failed to engage with the issue. In this paper, I shall reconstruct Aristotle’s account of inadvertently made objects and the (...) fortune of his examples. I will argue that Aristotle opens a conceptual space for inadvertent objects and will indicate the consequences for the relation between the intentions of the maker and an object’s essence. Furthermore, I will put Aristotle into conversation with modern accounts and show the extent to which Aristotelian inadvertent objects constitute an instance different from the currently debated cases of appropriation, residues and by-products. (shrink)

This valuable and interesting book attempts to discern the essential Freudian theses about the mind and to give them a cogent philosophical defense. Like many philosophers Gardner sees psychoanalytic explanation as continuous with folk psychology, though he holds that the latter needs considerable expansion in order to accommodate irrationality of the “Freudian” sorts.